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Concurrent Governance Processes of California’s Sustainable 
Groundwater Management Act 
Anita Milman and Michael Kiparsky 
California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) is a landmark policy that 
requires achievement of sustainability at the groundwater basin level. In this policy review 
and analysis, we describe the horizontal, vertical, and network governance processes 
occurring under SGMA and discuss how they interact with one another. In doing so, we 
review existing governance theories that can help to shed light on how each governance 
process may unfold. Depicting SGMA as a complex system of simultaneous and interacting 
governance processes provides a useful platform for future evaluations of SGMA successes 
and failures as well as for transferring lessons learned from California's implementation of 
SGMA to groundwater governance in other locations.  
Keywords: California; institutional collective action; implementation; governance; 
groundwater; networks; Sustainable Groundwater Management Act 
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Introduction 
In 2014, California passed the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) - 
a landmark policy that overcame years of stasis. Passage of SGMA advanced California’s 
limited ability to control groundwater depletion towards a nominal commitment to the 
highest standard of sustainability. The new law requires planning to achieve sustainability at 
the groundwater basin level, with a novel approach to groundwater governance1 that 
distributes authority and responsibility between local and state agencies, seeking to balance 
the benefits of and demands for local control with the need for oversight. 
 Prior to SGMA, groundwater across the state was primarily governed by a complex 
and unsettled combination of overlying, appropriative, and prescriptive rights (Littleworth 
and Garner 2007). Localized interventions to impose greater control were rare, and largely, 
though not entirely, limited to the courts and through adjudications, restricted county 
government regulation, or voluntary adoption of groundwater management plans (Cal. Water 
Code § 10750 et seq.). Despite acute impacts of groundwater depletion across the state, prior 
attempts to impose state-level oversight of the resource had been unsuccessful (Sax 2002). 
 
1 Governance refers to full set of organizations, structures, rules, and processes through expectations, decisions, 
and actions are collectively decided and acted upon. Management refers to the specific policies and 
decisions that guide actions as well as day-to-day actions influencing water. Governance is a predecessor to 
and sets up the framework through which management is decided and acted upon (Lemos and Agrawal 
2006). 
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Resistance from water users, concerns about economic impacts, and the lack of unified 
political support all contributed to the failure to generate an overarching framework for 
addressing California’s growing 
groundwater problem (Leahy 2015). 
California’s challenges in 
strengthening groundwater governance 
are not unique. Though groundwater 
depletion is a well-recognized global 
concern (Famiglietti 2014) and 
governance is seen as a solution to the 
global crisis (Foster et al. 2013), 
imposition of new forms of groundwater 
governance is frequently resisted. Water 
users have a strong short-term interest in 
unfettered use and resist top-down 
control, while policy-makers are often 
unwilling or unable to overcome the 
political risk of confronting strong constituencies. Further, in spite of the enumeration of 
multiple paradigms for groundwater governance (see e.g., Varady et al. 2016), it remains 
unclear which is most effective, under which conditions.   
Through SGMA, California adopted an approach to governance that requires a strong 
movement towards sustainability while allowing the state to retain prior groundwater 
governance structures, including existing water rights and regulations, and to balance 
tensions related to local versus top-down control. Scholars and practitioners around the world 
have rushed to put California’s new approach to groundwater governance under their 
microscopes. Many are eagerly watching as implementation of SGMA unfolds, seeking to 
evaluate whether and under what conditions the approach can be successful in California and 
elsewhere (Kiparsky et al. 2017). The valuable developing body of literature on SGMA (see 
SI Appendix 1) contains many individually insightful observations, yet each study examines 
only part of SGMA’s changes to both the governance and, subsequently, the management of 
groundwater in California. While SGMA has a unifying statutory core, in practice, it is not a 
single policy, action, or even approach. Identifying the key facets of SGMA that influence 
success on the ground, let alone generalizing to other contexts, will require making sense of 
multiple simultaneous dimensions of action.  
 In this policy review and analysis, we depict the complex system of simultaneous 
and interacting governance processes occurring as part of SGMA and examine the ways in 
which those processes influence how SGMA unfolds. Specifically, we elucidate the vertical, 
horizontal and network governance processes associated with SGMA and how those 
processes interact with one another. Our analysis synthesizes well-established theories of 
governance and draws on our experience researching, observing, and participating in SGMA 
implementation since the law was first passed. By providing a holistic perspective on the 
interacting governance processes embedded within SGMA, we paint a more complete picture 
of the concurrent processes contributing to the successes and failures of SGMA.  
 
2 Local public agencies could choose to join together to form a GSA either through a Memorandum of 
Agreement or a Joint Powers Agreement. These two legal mechanisms differ in the structure of the legal 
entity they create and responsibilities assigned to the agencies entering into the agreement. For more details 
see Kincaid, V., and Stager, R., (2015) “Know your options: A guide for formation of groundwater 
sustainability agencies” California Water Education Foundation: Sacramento. 
http://www.stancounty.com/er/pdf/groundwater/gsa-guide.pdf 
 
SGMA agencies. In this paper, we refer to 
several classes of key actors in SGMA.  
• Local agencies are pre-existing public 
agencies such as irrigation districts that are 
eligible to form GSAs singly or in groups.  
• Groundwater Sustainability Agencies (GSAs) 
are made up of one or more local agencies2, 
and are responsible and empowered to meet 
SGMA goals.  
• State agencies including DWR and SWRCB 
are responsible for oversight, enforcement and 
technical support of GSAs. 
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California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act 
SGMA sets a state policy of sustainably managing groundwater resources. Under the statute, 
sustainability is defined as the ‘management and use of groundwater in a manner that can be 
maintained during the [law’s] 50-year planning and implementation horizon without causing 
undesirable results’ (Cal. Water Code § 10721). SGMA’s six undesirable results include 
‘significant and unreasonable’ (1) depletion of supply, indicated by chronic lowering of 
groundwater levels; (2) reduction of groundwater storage; (3) seawater intrusion; (4) 
degraded water quality; (5) land subsidence that substantially interferes with surface land 
uses; and (6) adverse impacts on the beneficial uses of interconnected surface water (Cal. 
Water Code § 10721). 
  To achieve this goal, SGMA encouraged the formation of new local-level institutions 
for groundwater governance. These new ‘Groundwater Sustainability Agencies’ (GSAs) 
were to be self-organized by any existing city, county, water utility, special district, or 
combination of these agencies by June 2017. SGMA then delegates to GSAs responsibility 
for the development and implementation of Groundwater Sustainability Plans (GSPs). GSPs 
must include sustainability goals that include minimum thresholds – quantitative metrics 
representing the point at which groundwater conditions are unacceptable - for each of the six 
undesirable results. GSPs must also include measurable objectives – quantifiable goals for 
maintenance and improvement of groundwater conditions - and interim milestones – target 
values for groundwater conditions in five year increments - designed to achieve sustainability 
within twenty years of plan adoption (Cal. Water Code §10727). Where multiple GSAs 
formed in a basin, they are required to coordinate to ensure they use the same data and 
assumptions in their planning and that their efforts collectively will lead to sustainability on 
the basin scale (Cal. Water Code §10727.6). SGMA offers GSAs an array of authorities and 
substantial flexibility for implementation.  
A crucial and unique feature of SGMA lies in the combination of local governance 
required and supported by state law and the backstop of direct state oversight. The California 
Department of Water Resources (DWR) is tasked with review and approval of GSPs. Where 
local agencies are unable or unwilling to carry out SGMA responsibilities, or a GSA fails in 
its governance, planning, or implementation, SGMA provides for enforcement and sanctions, 
including potential intervention and takeover of management by the State Water Resources 
Control Board (SWRCB) (Cal. Water Code §10735).  
SGMA’s Concurrent Governance Processes  
SGMA triggers a complex system of interacting governance processes. The statute and 
accompanying regulations delegate responsibilities to newly formed GSAs, yet also create 
substantial guidance and oversight roles for state agencies. GSAs are comprised of existing 
public agencies, each of which has its own institutional structure, rules and processes to 
which it must adhere. Further, SGMA is unfolding within the context of existing water and 
non-water governance, policies (Littleworth and Garner 2007) and politics within California, 
an already contentious and ever-changing landscape.  
We contend that SGMA governance can be conceptualized as three concurrent and 
interacting processes: vertical, horizontal, and network governance (Figure 1). The remainder 
of this paper develops this conceptual structure.  
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Vertical Governance: SGMA as Policy Implementation 
The vertical dimension of SGMA governance is its primary governance process - a higher 
level of government requiring action by a lower level of government (Kiparsky et al. 2017). 
Such mandates occur commonly in the field of natural resources, in part due to the 
distribution of authority across levels of government. The relationship between state and 
local governments under SGMA is analogous to the relationship between the federal 
government and states under cooperative federalism (Owen 2018). Under cooperative 
federalism, the federal government sets standards and policy goals and states then define and 
undertake actions to achieve those standards and goals, with federal oversight and potential 
intervention where states do not comply. Under SGMA, the State of California set 
requirements for groundwater sustainability and delegates authorities and responsibilities to 
local agencies to achieve those objectives. Thus, the vertical governance under SGMA is 
local-level implementation of a top-down mandate.   
Implementation – the process of executing a policy – has long been an explanation for 
variation in successful achievement of policy goals and objectives (Hill and Hupe 2002).  
Several of the central components of policy, public administration and planning theories of 
implementation, and their effects on outcomes, are especially relevant to SGMA. 
Implementation depends in part on the design of the policy mandate, including the specificity 
and clarity of policy goals and requirements (Hill and Hupe 2002, Hupe and Hill 2016); the 
inclusion mechanisms for overseeing, enforcing, and sanctioning non-compliance; and the 
support or resources provided to the local-level entities charged with implementation (Deyle 
and Smith 1998, Berke, Lyles, and Smith 2014). Characteristics of ‘street-level bureaucrats’ 
– the front-line civil servants who undertake implementation – matter (Lipsky 1969), 
including how they interpret and understand the mandate (Hill and Hupe 2002) and their 
capacities for and commitment to implementation (Dahill-Brown and Lavery 2012, 
Tummers, Steijn, and Bekkers 2012, Norton 2005).  
Viewing SGMA through a policy implementation lens highlights the importance of 
the vertical relationship between the state and local levels in determining outcomes. The 
SGMA statute and regulations are specific and directive, but contain ambiguity. How state 
agencies and GSAs interpret requirements will influence the content, review, execution, and 
enforcement of GSPs. For example, SGMA requires defining of sustainable yield, an amount 
of groundwater extraction consistent with the law’s sustainability definition. A GSP will be, 
in effect, a GSA’s initial quantitative interpretation of these definitions in local context, but 
all GSPs will then be subject to state interpretation through DWR review. Capacities for 
implementation also vary. GSAs differ in size, technical knowledge, institutional support and 
budgets (Milman et al. 2018). In spite of state technical and financial support administered by 
DWR, local capacity will constrain implementation actions in many cases, regardless of 
motivation.  
Local-level pressures also have a strong influence on how GSAs respond to the 
mandate. GSAs are comprised of agencies with existing authorities and responsibilities, 
particularly to the constituents whom they serve. These agencies are often run by elected 
public officials and/or are reliant on public votes for imposing fees or approving decisions. 
As such, the political will of GSAs in responding to SGMA is defined by their constituents, 
including how those constituents see implementation of SGMA as affecting their interests 
and the bottom-up pressures they place upon GSAs. 
Lastly, GSAs operate with uncertainty about the state’s future choices as backstop, 
which have not yet been clearly signalled. Given ambiguity in requirements and definitions, 
combined with the latitude to locally define sustainability and sustainability pathways, many 
GSAs will weigh the costs of various compliance options against the probability of state 
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sanctions. GSA perceptions vary regarding the state’s enforcement priorities and the potential 
impacts of such enforcement. Many GSAs recognize that DWR and SWRCB have limited 
capacity, and expect the agencies to focus on the areas with the most acute problems. 3 
Consequently, GSA representatives may anticipate that their GSP only needs to be better 
than the worst batch, in the same way that an antelope need not run faster than a lion, it only 
need run faster than the slowest member of its herd. As such, within the vertical framework, 
decision-making by some GSAs is partly motivated by strategic, game theoretic 
considerations.  
Horizontal Governance: SGMA as Institutional Collective Action 
The horizontal dimension of SGMA governance encompasses the institutional collective 
action that has emerged in GSA formation and GSP development and will continue through 
implementation. Collective action occurs when interdependent resource users self-organize to 
jointly pursue a common goal. SGMA implementation in general, and GSA formation in 
particular, requires such self-organization by local agencies. The need for institutional 
collective action is common in natural resources, since frequently a separation of powers and 
authorities across agencies leads to multiple jurisdictions having control and impact on 
activities that affect shared resources or shared outcomes (Epstein et al. 2015). Under 
SGMA, GSAs are generally constrained in their geographies by the service areas of their 
founding agencies. Agency boundaries rarely coincide with the boundaries of the 
groundwater basin. In order to achieve basin-level sustainability, agencies had the choice of 
forming a multi-agency GSA or coordinating across GSAs in GSP development. In either 
circumstance, institutional collective action is necessary. 
Whether and how effective institutional collective action occurs is largely determined 
by how organizations balance a variety of sometimes competing motivations. Inter-
organizational relationships reflect bounded rational decisions that weigh the perceived 
merits of collective action and concerns about autonomy and control, both of which are 
moderated by existing relationships (Rossignoli and Ricciardi 2015, Feiock 2007, 2013, Scott 
and Thomas 2017). Institutional collective action is facilitated by linkages, a sense of 
interdependence, and a shared perspective on the problem and potential solutions (Kwon and 
Feiock 2010, Watson 2015), and made more challenging when agencies and their 
constituents have more diverse and divergent populations and interests (Feiock 2013, 2007, 
Kwon and Feiock 2010). Insufficient resources or the potential for economies of scale can 
motivate institutional collective action (Feiock 2007, Kwon and Feiock 2010); yet high 
transaction costs may outweigh potential gains (Feiock 2007, 2013). Lastly, organizational 
histories and established power relations are important as they influence trust and 
expectations (Brummel, Nelson, and Jakes 2012, Watson 2015, Kwon and Feiock 2010). 
Viewing SGMA through the lens of institutional collective action highlights the 
central role of the horizontal relationships between local agencies in determining 
groundwater sustainability outcomes. Outcomes of SGMA will depend on individual local 
agencies and their willingness to work together to address groundwater management 
concerns throughout the basin.  
Conditions are more ripe for institutional collective action in some groundwater 
basins than in others (Milman et al. 2018). Even prior to SGMA, some water agencies had 
been taking steps to address groundwater depletion. In some basins, agencies also have a 
 
3 This statement is based on structured and semi-structured interviews about GSP development conducted by the 
authors with representatives from over 40 GSAs in the critically over-drafted basins between January and 
November 2019. 
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history of collaboration- for example, through voluntary groundwater management plans, 
integrated water resources management plans, and urban water management plans. In other 
basins, tensions are higher and relationships are fraught with histories of lawsuits and 
disagreements. Further, basins vary in the heterogeneity of groundwater extraction and users 
within the basin, the distribution of surface and groundwater supplies, and the non-SGMA 
legal, institutional and procedural factors influencing water management policies and actions. 
These differences have immense implications for basin-level sustainability. In many basins, 
access to surface water has become the dividing point, with strong tensions between the 
haves and have-nots. Yet even variation in prior fees, regulations, and monitoring serve as 
barriers to agencies working together. As a result, institutional collective action has emerged 
in some basins yet not in others. Examples include multi-agency GSAs that span an entire 
basin, multiple GSAs with formal commitments to produce joint GSPs, and coordination 
agreements and committees working to coordinate across separate GSPs (Milman et al. 
2018).  
Network Governance: SGMA as Steering and Oversight through Informal Interactions 
The network governance dimension of SGMA encompasses the informal interactions among 
government and other private and public entities that influence and reinforce actions to 
achieve groundwater sustainability. Through these interactions, actors leverage relationships 
to disseminate information, create new/shared or reinforce existing norms, place pressure 
upon one another, and coordinate actions and activities (Jones 1997; Provan and Kenis 2008; 
Carlsson and Sandström 2008, Marsh and Smith 2000).  Not only has passage of SGMA 
sparked the creation of new actors and relationships (i.e. networks), interactions across 
networks that pre-date SGMA have had and will continue to have an important role in the 
outcomes of SGMA.  
Network governance can include, yet often occurs outside of formal governmental 
structures. Epistemic communities (Haas 2007), communities of practice (Goldstein and 
Butler 2010), boundary organizations (Guston 2001), and other forms of networks serve to 
create, translate and disseminate knowledge between and among groups of actors (Phelps, 
Heidl, and Wadhwa 2012, Feldman 2012). This knowledge sharing facilitates policy 
diffusion and uptake (Lecy, Mergel, and Schmitz 2014). It also serves as a source of soft 
power (Feldman 2012).  Networks can compel emulation of certain values, public policies 
and practices through the institutionalization of beliefs and values, development of common 
language and tacit rules for behaviour (Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti 1997, Carlsson and 
Sandström 2008). Further, networks can serve as a source of oversight and pressure, 
particularly when the exchange that occurs through them includes surveillance and the 
spreading of information about behaviour or reputations (Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti 1997).  
Viewing SGMA through the lens of network governance serves to highlight the 
central role of the interactions between and among GSAs, non-profits, professional 
associations, think tanks, mediators, consultants, lawyers, and the media in determining 
groundwater sustainability outcomes. DWR, professional associations, interest groups, and 
GSAs themselves have sponsored conferences and calls to promote information sharing 
among GSAs. Think-tanks, non-profits and universities continue to produce reports, hold 
workshops and disseminate information, tools and recommendations to GSAs. In addition, 
facilitators, hydrogeologic and legal consultants and other professionals hired to assist GSA 
formation and GSP development have developed email list serves, held conference calls and 
used other mechanisms to exchange information about their experiences and transmit that 
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information to entities with whom they work. Lastly, through newspapers, blogs, and new 
websites, third parties are disseminating information about SGMA and its implementation. 
These activities serve as governance in a number of ways. First, they are leading to 
norm formation and reinforcement. Through these interactions, groundwater sustainability 
has become a focal point of water-related discourse in California, regularly raised as a topic 
of concern in meetings, announcements, planning and news. Interactions occurring through 
and across networks have also served to cement interpretations of the requirements of SGMA 
as well as approaches for complying with the law. For example, interactions occurring as a 
result of networks are influencing how GSAs as well as DWR understand and make 
decisions regarding defining and using measurable thresholds in planning, surface ground-
water interactions, groundwater dependent ecosystems, and compatibility across technical 
analysis methods, among other topics (SI Appendix 2). Secondly, the networks responding to 
SGMA are playing a role in oversight and enforcement. Analyses, examination, and 
commentaries by third parties serve as a form of transparency as well as public pressure for 
compliance as well as enforcement. (See SI Appendix 2 for additional examples). 
The intent of the information exchange varies across networks and network 
participants.  In some instances, the exchange is intended as objective transmission of expert 
knowledge. Yet networks are not inherently neutral (Marsh and Smith 2000, Swyngedouw 
2005) and in some instances, the underpinnings of exchange seek to steer decision-making in 
ways that support a particular social, environmental, or professional agenda. Further, the 
influence of network governance under SGMA will depend on how information, ideas and 
norms are received. Some GSAs have solidified ideas and norms about groundwater 
management, and are not easily swayed by outside input, whereas other GSAs are more open 
to and interested in receiving advice and guidance. Further, where third parties use 
information to increase pressure on GSAs, through news media, public engagement or 
lawsuits, network governance may have a stronger impact on implementation of SGMA.   
Discussion  
The above analysis of SGMA shows how even a single, albeit complex, legislative mandate 
to address a heretofore relatively ungoverned commons can require multiple, intersecting 
governance processes. The many concurrent governance processes occurring as a result of 
SGMA are strongly connected and serve to reinforce one another (Figure 1). While the 
statute itself is top-down (vertical), it incentivizes local-level collective action (horizontal), 
which in turn is motivated by the both the threat of potential state-level intervention and the 
resources, incentives and support provided by the state (vertical). The intersection between 
horizontal and vertical governance also means that where horizontal governance efforts are 
incomplete or unsuccessful, the state backstop provides a mechanism for the state to assume 
responsibilities. Thus, failure of horizontal governance does not indicate failure of SGMA, 
but rather calls for vertical governance to designate the pathway towards achieving 
groundwater sustainability. Network governance supports both vertical and horizontal 
governance by filling gaps in communication and knowledge and aiding in norm formation 
and enforcement.  
 
Figure 1. Interaction Across the Multiple Governance Processes Embedded in SGMA. 
Implementation of the statute (Vertical) will depend on outcomes of institutional collective action 
within each basin (Horizontal) as well as DWR and SWRCB oversight, and if necessary, intervention 
(Vertical). GSA decisions are influenced by their constituents - depicted as urban, agricultural, and 
rural residential - and perceptions of the mandate (Vertical). Institutional collective action 
(Horizontal) within each basin is motivated by the statute and the threat of intervention and facilitated 
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by resources and support provided by DWR and the state. Institutional collective action is mediated 
by the support, advice and pressure created through interactions across GSAS as well as with third 
parties - consultants, lawyers, facilitators, think tanks, industry associations and universities 
(Network). Lastly, networks emerged in response to passage of the statute and seek to inform both 
state agency (Vertical) and local-level (Horizontal) decision-making. 
 
 
 
 
Outcomes of SGMA thus need to be understood and evaluated not as simply an 
experiment in local-level governance, but in light of the interacting vertical, horizontal and 
network governance processes. However, this conceptual framework is far from 
comprehensive. Other essential and interrelated processes include those associated with the 
integration of land and water policy, and with the integration of science into policy, among 
others (Roberts, Milman, and Blomquist forthcoming). Within each governance process, how 
politics manifests and is resolved, have implications from SGMA.  
Conclusion  
SGMA has spawned a novel, hybrid approach to groundwater governance, embedded within 
specific constraints in California water policy and politics. Our analysis has highlighted some 
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complexities in SGMA governance, in particular the interplay between vertical, horizontal 
and network governance processes. This framework has a number of implications: 
First, for those invested in the success of SGMA itself, and for scholars seeking clear 
understanding of SGMA, a holistic view will be important. With multiple moving parts, 
careful on-going evaluation and refinement of governance processes will be critical for long-
term success. Further, it would be a mistake to define success of SGMA narrowly based on 
basin-scale outcomes. The crucial benefits of norm creation and shifting assumptions, 
network formation, a structure for broader topical and geographic integration, and learning 
within and between basins constitute individually and collectively powerful system-level 
advancement for California water management. Situating evaluations of SGMA within 
frameworks such as that proposed here could foster a broader, integrative perspective.  
Second, for practitioners viewing SGMA as a potential model for governance 
schemes in other places, it is important to recognize that SGMA elements are interconnected 
and mutually reinforcing by necessity and by design. Porting any partial analogue of 
SGMA’s model to other areas without careful examination of the potential gaps that might 
result may have consequences for effective governance.  
Finally, we commend SGMA’s authors for finding a politically palatable approach 
through which the State could take action to address its groundwater problem. Much of the 
hybrid structure described here flows explicitly from SGMA legislation, and many of the 
essential elements are implicitly embedded in statute and regulations. There remains much 
work to be done if SGMA is to succeed in its ambitious goals, but the foundation provides a 
strong point of departure.  
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SI Appendix 2:  Examples of Network Governance  
 
As described in the article text, the network governance dimension of SGMA encompasses the 
informal interactions among government entities, think-tanks, universities, industry associations, 
non-profit organizations, professionals, and private citizens that influence and reinforce actions 
to achieve groundwater sustainability. In California, a large network of entities, representing the 
spectrum of water interests and expertise, has historically sought to influence water governance. 
In addition, SGMA has catalysed the development of new networks. These networks have 
mobilized to disseminate information, share experience and knowledge, provide 
recommendations and tools, and oversee or monitor progress. A key outcome of this network 
governance is norm creation and reinforcement. Below are several examples of the network 
governance that is occurring under SGMA. Due to the decentralized nature of network 
governance and the vast extent of mobilization under SGMA, it is not possible to present a 
complete depiction of all of the entities involved in the network governance processes of SGMA. 
As such, information in Table SI A2 is exemplary, rather than comprehensive.  
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Table	A2.2	Network	Governance	in	relation	to	SGMA		
Network Activities Examples 
Events: A number of conferences, 
workshops, webinars and symposium have 
been organized that focus entirely or contain 
dedicated panels addressing SGMA. Through 
these events, individuals and organizations 
share ideas and learn from one another about 
key topics and interpretations of SGMA.  
Information and norms developed through 
this exchange is then transmitted from 
participants in these fora to the deliberations 
and decision-making of GSAs, state agencies 
and the consultants, lawyers and facilitators 
participating in SGMA implementation. 
 
§ SGMA Survival Roundtable  
§ Groundwater Sustainability Forum  
§ The South Valley SGMA Practitioners Roundtable  
§ GSA Summit (First and Second Annual) 
§ SGMA Conference – Tools for Developing a GSA 
§ Kern County Water Summit 
§ American Pistachio Growers SGMA Survival Toolkit Workshop 
Guidance Documents: A variety of 
organizations and actors have produced white 
papers, policy-briefs, blog posts and websites 
explaining SGMA, interpreting its 
requirements, providing data and 
information, and recommending best 
practices for GSP development and 
implementation. These documents have been 
disseminated to GSAs, to stakeholder groups 
and interested parties, to policy-makers, to 
DWR and to the general public. Anecdotal 
evidence from decision-makers suggests that 
many of these products have influenced 
understandings of SGMA and of 
groundwater. This information can be 
particularly influential in generating 
California Water Foundation 
2014. An Evaluation of California Groundwater Management Planning. 
2015. Know Your Options: A Guide to Forming Groundwater Sustainability 
Agencies. Sacramento, CA. 
Community Water Center 
2015. Collaborating for Success: Stakeholder Engagement in Sustainable 
Groundwater Management Act Implementation.  
Duke University - Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions 
2016. Sharing Groundwater: A Robust Framework and Implementation Roadmap 
for Sustainable Groundwater Management in California. 
Public Policy Institute of California 
2014. Funding Sustainable Groundwater Management in California.  
2019 Water and the Future of the San Joaquin Valley 
Stanford University - Water in the West & Gould Center for Conflict Resolution 
2014. Groundwater Data: California's Missing Metric  
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innovations by providing new ideas for 
decision-makers such as GSA managers, 
agency staff, or consultants) as well as in 
refining, supporting or legitimizing policies 
or actions being considered.    
2015. California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of 2014: 
recommendations for preventing and resolving groundwater conflicts.  
2015.  The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of 2014: Challenges and 
Opportunities for Implementation.  
2016. From the Ground Down: Understanding Local Groundwater Data Collection 
and Sharing Practices in California. 
2016. To Consolidate or Coordinate? Status of the Formation of Groundwater 
Sustainability Agencies in California.  
2017.  Projecting Forward A Framework for Groundwater Model Development 
Under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act.  
2019. Putting Adaptive Management Into Practice: Incorporating Quantitative 
Metrics into Sustainable Groundwater Management.  
The Nature Conservancy.  
2019. Groundwater Resource Hub: Understanding and Managing Groundwater 
Dependent Ecosystems.    
2019. Groundwater Dependent Ecosystems Under the Sustainable Groundwater 
Management Act: Guidance for Preparing Groundwater Sustainability Plans  
Union of Concerned Scientists  
2015.  Measuring What Matters: Setting Measurable Objectives to Achieve 
Sustainable Groundwater Management in California. 
2017. Navigating a Flood of Information.  
n.d. Groundwater Technical Assistance Tool 
Water Education Foundation 
2015. The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act: A Handbook to 
Understanding and Implementing the Law.  
University of California - Berkeley Wheeler Water Institute  
2016. Designing Effective Groundwater Sustainability Agencies: Criteria for 
Evaluation of Local Governance Options. 
2017. Trading Sustainably: Critical Considerations for Local Groundwater 
Markets Under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act. 
2018 When Is Groundwater Recharge a Beneficial Use of Surface Water in 
California.  
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2018 Navigating Groundwater-Surface Water Interactions Under the Sustainable 
Groundwater Management Act.  
University of California - Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics  
2017 California’s New Groundwater Law and the Implications for Groundwater 
Markets. 
2018 The Economic Impacts of Agricultural Groundwater Markets 
Information Clearinghouse: Third-party 
websites have been created to consolidate 
information on SGMA to make it more 
accessible to agencies and stakeholders.  
These websites share experiences and 
promote learning, as well as track 
implementation. As concrete elements of a 
network governance process, these websites 
enable diffusion of ideas, support norm 
creation in tandem with the materials they 
house, and provide guidance. Yet they also 
serve as indirect oversight by providing a 
point of comparison across basins, 
highlighting positive and negative events 
occurring in basins, and aggregating 
commentary on how the law will be 
interpreted and enforced. 
 
§ The Groundwater Exchange 
§ Water Wrights 
§ Maven’s Notebook 
Coordination of Activities: Organizations 
have sought to maximize the effectiveness of 
their network governance activities. By 
coordinating their efforts, network actors are 
able to capitalize on economies of scale, pool 
resources, or strengthen their influence in 
norm creation and/or in putting pressure on 
GSAs, state agencies, or stakeholders 
involved in implementation of SGMA.  
The Water Foundation organized an ongoing, quarterly forum (the Groundwater 
Leadership Forum) that brings together key representatives from over 15 NGOs from 
among its grantees, in addition to a few academics in an auxiliary capacity. 
Participants in this forum jointly produced and sent comment letters to California 
State government on SGMA implementation generally. Members of the Forum also 
decided to collectively focus their efforts on supporting a rigorous review of draft 
GSPs submitted in the first round. They developed a template for evaluation of GSPs 
and have been collaborating on jointly producing GSP reviews. 
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